M y own words are coming back to haunt me and my unspoken assumptions are hounding me. Five years ago I wrote in this journal that we would all do well to go slowly in fixing the modes of dignity in dying. The one attitude we must criticize, I said, is thanatological totalitarianism, the idea that there is only one right way to die (2) . I implied that there are many ways to die with dignity and that resigned acceptance of imminent death is no more an expression of human dignity than is Dylan Thomas' admonition to rail against the dying of the light and to go raging into that gentle night.
I was thinking then of attitudes, not acts, and I was quite comfortable with my thanatological liberalism. I was opposed to the idea that dignity in dying required people to exhibit the pose, the attitude, and the sentiments of acceptance of death. But I was all along assuming that rectitude, if not dignity, demanded of people that they accept -this means, that they awaittheir time, their moment of death. This assump-. tion, some would say, this very theocratic as-.
sumption, is now massively under attack. rational, and straightforward. He didn't await death. He wrapped up work on his collected papers, wrote a note, and -awful freedom in essential isolation -he shot himself (4).
That's how Bridgman died. He was aware of his essential isolation, and, though I had never met him, I, as a. physics student, was aware of his presence in the original and penetrating ideas with which I had to grapple. I could never bring myself to judge his way of facing his impending demise and death from cancer. It would seem terribly wrong of me to presume the understanding and the capacity, let alone the right, to judge his act. But I cannot suppress my questions. Are human beings really so essentially isolated as he thought? Does his "awful freedom", and mine, or anyone else's include mastery over the time of one's death? Is the decision to await death and to pass through the disintegration and the losses of dying any less rational or straightforward than the decision to assume control and determine the time of one's death?
And I cannot forget Tolstoy's question about the peasants either. Tolstoy asked: "And the mujiks? How do the mujiks die?" (5) . Well, they died, if Phillippe Aries is correct (6), the way Solzhenitsyn describes the dying of the older folk in The Cancer Ward: no puffing up of themselves, no fighting against death, no pretending they weren't going to die, no stalling about squaring things away. They prepared themselves quietly and they departed easily "as if they were just moving into a new house." (7) If that's how the mujiks died, it is not how many people today think they will die. Many people today fear loss of control when the time comes to die. They fear, as a recent editorial in Nature states, a~twi light life tethered to feeding tubes or respirators" (8) . Of course, resistance has grown mightily over the last decades against technological zeal to prolong life at all costs and to the bitter biological end: There is today a • solidly entrenched consensus, and a developed casuistry, both in medical ethics .and jurisprudence, in favor of allowing people to die in peace. and dignity. Some physicians still seem to be unaware of this, and some particular cases will always provoke agonizing discussion, but the trend against senseless tethering of people to lifeprolongation technology is generally serene and probably irreversible. This trend now seems to challenge the basic assumptions of relatively few people, at least in North America.
Enter the Hemlock Society, Diane and Dr. Timothy Quill. Diane, a married woman with a husband, a college-age son, a business' and her artistic work, was diagnosed as having acute myelomonocytic leukemia. She rejected the chemotherapy option. The side effects and the roughly 25 percent chance of long-term survival were not for her. What Diane feared the most, according to Dr. Quill's description, was increasing discomfort, dependence, and hard choices between pain and sedation. Diane made it clear to her family and to Dr. Quill that when the time came, she wanted to take her life in the least painful way possible. Dr. Quill thought this made sense, aware as he was of Diane's desire for independence and of her decision to stay in control. He consequently referred her to Hemlock Society information about suicide and made sure Diane knew how to use the barbiturates for sleep and the amount needed to commit suicide. This is what Diane did when bone pain, weakness, fatigue, and fevers began to assume control of her life (9) .
In this same year as Dr. Quill's New England Journal of Medicine story of Diane, Derek Humphry, president of Hemlock Society, has published Final Exit. The book is directed to those in terminal illness who desire practical advice about how to end their lives at a time of their choice. The book, if the Nature editorial is correct, is not for those who consider God the master of their fate, but rather for those who want to have control over the time of death (10) . This is where my words of thanatological liberalism of five years ago, and my unspoken assumption, begin to haunt and 'hound me. We live in a post-modern world. We.instinctively mistrust universal prescriptions proposed as applying to all people in all times and in all places. How, in such a world, can anyone seriously claim that there is only one right, rational, and dignified way to die? However, this question cuts more than one way. It cuts against those who would want to impose theocratic heroism on people; and it cuts equally well against those who would ridicule the mujiks. I, for one, cast my lot with the mujiks, and I will seek to articulate and defend assumptions that reveal our essential human bonding over those that proclaim our essential isolation. That option is allowed in a pluralistic world, if pluralism is to survive.
